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Volume 17 Summer 1980 No. 4
THE ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE COURSE
IN THE 1980s
Barb.ara Warnick
The observation that "we live in a time of change" is certainly not .star
tling. Like ino.st components of the curriculum, forensics education is cur
rently undergoing a number of changes. During the 1960s and 1970s,
speech communication scholars expressed concern about the place of ar
gumentation, debate, and forensic activities in higher education,' They
wondered aloud about the increasingly specialized world of tournament
debating, its relevance to the overall curriculum, and its relationship to
the discipline of speech communication. Also at issue in this controversy
was the role of the argumentation and debate course. What student audi
ence doe,s it serve, and what learning objectives should it have? The pur
pose of this essay is to examine the place of argumentation and debate in
the speech communication curriculum and to suggest some objectives and
activities which might be helpful to the forensics educator who teaches
the course.
It is difficult to consider the role of the argumentation and debate course
without at the same time examining its relationship to the extracurricular
forensics prognun. Glen E. Mills has observed that the course originated
in the early twentieth century when intercollegiate debaters sought faculty
help in prepsiring for contests. Mills continued by stating that, "in time the
philosophy and method of tlie course underwent changes in some places,
but the dominant adaptations contitmed to favor the interests of school
debaters and future lawyers."^ Mills made this obseiwation in 1961, how
ever, and since that time essays and textbooks on argumentation indicate
that course content varies greatU from one institution to another.'' Course
Barbara Wamick is an Assistant Professor of Speech Communication at the Uni
versity' ofWa-shington. She was formerly Direc tor of Forensics atTulane University,
' See Don Geiger. "The Humanistic Direction of Debate," Speech Teacher, 14
(1965), 1(11-106; William H. Bennett, "The Hole of Debate in Speech Communica
tion, Speech Teacher. 21 (1972), 281-288; David Thomas, "Forensics Shock:
Making Forensics Relevant to Tomorrow's Higher Education," Speech Teacher,
23 (1974), 23,5-241; and James H. McBath, "Future Directions for Forensics
Education," Speech Teacher, 24 (1975), .366—368.
* Glen E. Mills, "Argumentation in General Education," Southern Speech Jour
nal, 26(1961), 313.
^A number of descriptions ol and proposals for the course have appeared in
speech journals, some of which e.xpha-size argumentation theory to the exclusion of
debate practice. See, for example, D. Ray Heisey, "An Honors Course in Argumen
tation," Speech Teacher, 17 (1968), 202-294; and Paul J. Dovre, "The Basic
Course in Argumentation: A Prospectus," Central States Speech Jounwl, 22 (1971),
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design depends on the needs and interests of students enrolled, the spe
ciality and goals of the instructor, and the presence or absence of an ex
tracurricular program in forensics.
Further complicating this situation is the changing nature of the speech
communication discipline. Speech has grown steadily away from teach
ing skills to undergraduates and has become a more "content-orient
ed" discipline. As Robert Kully observed, "the discipline of speech com
munication is moving away from practices and activities toward theory and
academics as a means of finding its identity in the academic institution
and of justifying its contribution to higher education."^ In line with this
trend, undergraduate courses in speech communication are as likely, if not
more likely, to stress recent developments in communication theory, se
mantics, nonverbal behavior, group process, etc., than they are performance
skills. The place of a debate course in all this is left open to doubt, and
some departments have discarded it completely.
A second recent development in speech communication which raises
questions conceniing debate and argumentation i.s its interdisciplinary
"drift." One study of speech communication graduates concluded tliat de
bate as an area of specialization within speech dropped from 20.7% of
graduates in 1968-69 to 14.6% in 1977-78. Areas of growth were inter
personal and mass communication and communication theory. There was
also a steady increase in advertising and journalism, areas not regarded as
lying traditionally within the speech communication field.®
Developments such as these resulted in the Sedalia conference of fo
rensics educators in 1974. Conference participants agreed that forensics
education should remain firinl\- attached to the administration and curri
cula a of speech communication depaitments and that forensics directors
should be trained in speech communication. In regard to curricuUir offer
ings in argumentation and debate, conference participants recommended
that "the forensics educator should contribute to curriculum development
in speech communication and related disciplines. Particular attention
should be given to the application of argumentation to the study of social
issues, to serving students with special interests (e.g., prelaw), and to in
terdisciplinary instruction.""
236-241. Some textbooks for the course stress debate as an essential means of
ac(iuiriiig proficiency in argumentation. Examples are Austin J. Freeley, Argumen
tation and Debate: Rational Decision Making, 2nd ed. (Belinont, CA: Wadsworth,
1961); and Douglas Ehiiinger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision by Debate, 2nd ed.
(New York: Harper & Row, 1978). Meanwhile, other authors iocus on argumentation
theory applied in all settings of which educational debate is only one. Rus.sel R.
Windes's and Arthur Hastings's Argumenfa^ioii and Advocacy (New York; Random
House, 1965) is a good example ot this approach.
' Robert D. Kully, "Forensics and the Speech Communication Discipline: Ajial-
ysis of an Estrangement," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 8 (1972),
196.
^ David Clavier, Theodore Clevenger, Jr., Susan Eide Khair, and Marwan M.
Khair, "Twelve-Year Employment Trends for Speech Communication Graduates,"
Communication £duca/iori 28 (1979), 312-313. See also Kathleen M. Jamieson
and Arthur D. Wolvin, "Nonteaching Careers in Communication: Implications for
the Speech Communication Curriculum," Communication Education 25 (1976),
283-291.
" McBath, p. 366.
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Developments within the speech coinnnmication field and the recorn-
inendations of fnrensics educators themselves therefore indicate that the
argumentation and debate course no longer should lie designed merely to
serve tournament debaters, speech majors, and prelaw students. While
these groups will probably enroll in the course at most institutions, the
course also should be designed to interest and benefit otlier groups—mass
communications and public relations majors, future teachers of speech,
and liberal arts majors.
Indeed, argumentation and debate can be one of the most valuable
courses in the undergraduate program. I believe it should be designed to
stress both argumentation theor> and skill development. A course which
stresses theory application in actual classroom debates can fulfill many
cognitive and behavioral objectives. If students who complete the course
successfully fulfill its objectives, they shoidd be able to produce clear,
well-reasoned cli.scourse, to develop and recognize sound argument, to
locate obscure infonnation through original research, and to recognize the
complex problems inherent in public policy decision-making. Argumen
tation and debate courses also develop basic skills. Students gain experi
ence in critical listening, clear oral expression, rapid, accurate note taking,
and organization. Given the current concern about basic skills develop
ment, the course can be invaluable to some undergraduates.
The course which I am about to describe would be conducted in a work-
shop-like atnu)spherc. A basic debate text would provide a common core
of readings in argumentation and debate theory. Independent study proj
ects, diverse debate topic areas, and class reports would supplement com
mon readings and activities and would meet specialized needs of iiidivicl-
ual students, A heterogeneous group of students can make the ar-
gumentati{)n and debate course more interesting and worthwhile to all if
individualized instruction and independent study are incorporated into it.
I will now list possible course objectives and common activities and tlien
suggest ways in which the course can he designed to fit students' needs
and interests.
Course Objectives for Argumentation and Debate
In suggesting cognitive and behavioral ohjective.s for an argumentation
and debate course, I realize that some institutions will want to focus on
concept development while others will stress performance. Both are need
ed, however, for the student can become adept at the use of forms of
argument only b\ practicing advocacy. On the basis of class composition
and the place of the course in the larger curriculum, the instructor can
decide upon an "optimal mix" of the following.
A. Cognitive Objectives
During and iifter completing a course in argumentation and debate, stu
dents shouhl be able to:
1. perceive and understand any given (]uestion from a wide variety of
perspectives;
2. understand the issues in propositions of fact, value, and policy;
3. comprehend and remember basic debate theory;
4. understaml the forms of argument—c asual, inductive, sign, etc.;
5. know the structure of argument fonn.s—syllogism, enthymeme, Toul-
min model, etc.;
6. know the ty pes of evidence—original, hearsay, biased, reluctant, lay,
expert, etc,
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B. Behavioral Objectives
Upon completion of an argumentation and debate course, students
should have achieved a certain proficiency in skills which enable them to:
1. research the topic effectively (to work with government documents,
specialized statistical compilations, microfiched documents, etc.);
2. record and organize researched information efficiently;
3. analyze soundly the proposition;
4. present a clearly organized case;
5. listen accurately;
6. take clear, organized, succinct notes {i.e., to flow the debate);
7. prove and extend arguments, avoiding assertion;
8. detect and point up weaknesses in opponents' arguments;
9. cross examine and respond to cross examination;
10. persuade an audience;
11. be an effective critic judge of others' debates.
C. Course Assifinments: Meeting Learning Objectives
Assignments in an argumentation and debate course should be carefully
designed to fulfill the objectives selected by the instructor. The recom
mendations which follow may not be appropriate in every situation. Their
usefulness and importance will depend upon overall course design and on
the level of student proficiency.
To guarantee that students analyze a topic area from many perspectives,
I recommend that the class members form four-member groups based on
career or major interests, select a topic area relevant to those interests, and
debate in that topic area for the entire tenn. There will probably be time
for two or three debates, depending upon the extent to which performance
skills are stressed. If this is the case, students should be encouraged to
switch sides, vary case fonnats, or debate different types of propositions
within the same topic area. If the topic were "mass media communication,"
for example, a four-person group might deijate three propositions during
the course of the semester:
Proposition of Fact— Resolved: That television violence is increas
ing.
Proposition of Value— Resolved: That federal government regulation
of television programing is desirable.
Proposition of Policy— Resolved: That the federal government should
restrict violence in children's television pro
graming.
Likewise, when debating policy propo.sitions, students could be en
couraged to vary case formats. They could begin with traditional affirma
tive and negative cases early in the term and move to goals, criteria, and
comparative advantages affirmatives and negative counterplans later. Their
increasing knowledge of debate theory would therefore be complemented
by an increasing repertoire of case fonnats and fonns of analysis. Addi
tionally, they would gain increa.sed understanding of the intricacies of
public policy decision-making.
Other variations include the study and practice of various debate for
mats. On or off campus audience debates late in the term provide students
who have mastered debating skills the opportunit>' to analyze diverse au
diences and to practice atlvocacy in "real world" situations. Students can
also experiment with two-party Lincoln-Douglas debates, parliamentary
6
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debates, and heckling. Some fonn of cross examination should be included
in at least one assignment as well. Students should be encouraged to ob
serve and evaluate argumentation in televised political debates and public-
debates in the community.
To provide experience in the use and analysis of various argument forms
and structures, the instructor could make "mini-assignments" early in the
term which call for audience response and evaluation. Students could de
sign and construct arguments with concealed fallacies or faulty evidence.
Class members could then analyze these to detect their weaknesses.
At the time they enroll in the argumentation and debate course, many
college undergraduates have not had extensive research experience. Their
library research in many cases appears limited to the card catalog and the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. If the instructor discovers this to
be tlie case, lectures can be arranged to acquaint students with specialized
journals and other research facilities. Legal researchers, government doc
uments librarians, and other specialists could speak to class members and
familiarize them with procedures involved in using less accessible re
sources.
Institutions witli an extracurricular forensics program provide additional
resources for tlie argumentation and debate course. Demonstration debates
by experienced debaters not enrolled in the course provide inexperienced
students with needed performance and role models. They also spark class
discussion and analysis of the argumentation and strategies used during
the debate.
Videotaping student debates is as useful in the argumentation and de
bate course as in other speech communication courses. After videotapes
have been made, the instructor can meet with debaters to watch the play
back and review their presentations with them. Students viewing them
selves in a relaxed atmosphere after the debate is over will often detect
errors in their own presentations which even their opponents and the
instructor have missed.
By now it should be apparent that the sort of course I ajn describing is
activity based and perfonnance oriented. In part this arises from an edu
cational philosophy wherein the students themselves are the source of
their learning.^ Proponents of experiential education believe that what
students do not know for themselves, they do not know. In an argumen
tation and debate course oi the sort I am describing, the instructor is a
classroom manager who initiates, structures, and reacts to students' work
rather than a lecturer and iiiformation disseminator. In proposing this sort
of syllabus, I realize that it may not be universally appropriate.
The second reason 1 am proposing a perfonnance course is that com-
j>etition among students has been shown to be a motivating factor in stu
dent learning." Healthy and productive rivalry between students engaged
' For examples of the educational philosophy underlying experiential education,
see Van Cleve Morris, Existentialism in Education: What It Means (New York:
Harper & Row, 1966); and David E. Denton, ed., Existentialism and Phenomen
ology in Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 1974).
" Ehninger and Brockriede cite a study by Hurlock, Bykowski, Miiller, Whitte-
more, and Scott which found "(a) competition stimulates increa.sed effort; (b) com
petition has a greater influence on perfonnance than do appeals to utility and altru
ism; and (c) the net gain in performance of groups in which rivalry exists over those
in which it does not is substantial." This is reported in the first edition of their
Decision by Debate (New York; Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1963), p. .308.
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in competitive advocacy can stimulate effort and academic performance to
a much greater extent than can grades or other forms of reinforcement, A
third reason for an activity based course is that it allows for individualized
instruction. While the class as a whole can undertake a common core of
readings, assignments, and activities, a performance and activity course
can at the same time provide the freedom for each student to conduct
independent projects and adapt the course to his/her own needs.
Auxiliary Activities:
Adapting the Course to Student Interest
As mentioned above, many types of students enroll in argumentation
and debate. Student leaders, prelaw students, tournament debaters, future
speech educators, public relations and mass communications majors, and
general liberal arts majors all have different reasons for taking the course.
One important way of making the course as relevant as possible to these
groups is to allow students to select their topic areas rather than to assign
topics. Prelaw students might select propositions concerning the structure
of the court system or freedom of speech, for example. Mass communica
tions and public relations majors might choose to debate issues concerning
regulation of the mass media, while future teachers might be intere.sted in
topics related to secondar>' and higher educational policies. If the majority
of students in the class debate ii^ topic areas in which they already have
some background and interest, the research may be of better quality, the
students will be more motivated, and the learning will certainly be more
relevant. Debating in topic areas relevant to their major also enables stu
dents to become more familiar with infonnation and resources particular
to their own interest cueas.
Independent study projects relevant to the course can provide valuable
experiences for diverse groups of students. Public relations and mass com
munications majors generally see the course as an opportunity to acquire
additional experience in persuasive speaking and forms of advocacy. Pub
lic relations practitioners' duties, for example, include "supplying speech
service to management, including research for speech material, prepara
tion tor manuscripts, publishing speeches, running speaker training ses
sions . . . and conducting speakers' bureaus for use by groups within or
outside the community."® This group might enjoy arranging and partici
pating in public or televised debates, contacting guest lecturers to speak
to the class, and conducting field interviews.
Another group of students have an entirely different set of needs and
expectations regarding the argumentation and debate course. This group,
future speech educators, received particular attention from the Sedalia
conference which recommended that "all colleges that provide teacher-
training prograjns in speech communication should offer formal instruction
in the philosophy and methods of directing forensics.""' Future speech
teachers are interested in basic debate theorv', in knowing how to judge
and critique debates, and in the mechanics of forensics direction. If an
additional course in forensics direction is not available, the instructor
should involve this group in setting up and conducting a mock or actual
'Judith S. Trent and Jimmie D. Trent, "Public Relations Education: An Oppor
tunity for Speech Communication," Communication Education, 25 (1976), 294.
McBath, p. 368.
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touniainent. Ample time should also be devoted to having this group cri
tique classroom debates and defend their decisions.
Prelaw students and general liberal arts majors hope to master the forms
of argument and construct persuasive cases. Prelaw students can stutly
debate as courtroom advocacy b>' observing mock and actual courtroom
trials. The liberal arts major may be interested in the conduct of contro-
versv' in a broad range of public forum.s—the student government, the city
council, and the state legislature, lor example. Liberal arts majors could
observe how different audiences and settings afTect argumentation and
persuasive appeals used by advocates.
Tournament debaters also ma) enroll in the argumentation and debate
course because they want a comprehensive review of debate theor\' and
an opportunit)' to familiarize themselves with current theoretical develop
ments in argumentation and debate theory. They should be encouraged to
a.ssist lellow students with research problems and strategy development.
If their role in the class is appropriate, they can serve as role models and
be a motivating influence on other students. Tournament debaters might
also enjoy reading, reporting on, and demonstrating concepts and tech
niques which comprise current debate theor\—alternative justification
cases, turnarounds, studies counterplans, etc. Such activities would expose
less experienced students to current theory and make the class more ex
citing.
Conclusion
In an era characterized by a shrinking undergraduate population and a
decrease in support for extracurricular programs, survival of the argumen
tation and debate course depends upon its appeal to a broad range of
students. Upon completion of their undergraduate programs, these stu
dents fre(iuently seek entrance into graduate or professional schools or
employment. They are aware of the glut of college graduates entering the
labor force and of the fiei'ce competition for opportunities in graduate ed
ucation. The)' therefore seek out courses relevant to their needs and in
terests which will give them a competitive edge when they have com
pleted their undergraduate programs. The) want to improve basic skills,
develop coTifidence in their communicative abilities, and compete suc
cessfully with their peers. The argumentation and debate course has con
siderable potential for fulfilling the needs of these students, but only to
the extent that it assumes an interdisciplinary focus and departs from the
narrow confines of tournament debating.
The argumentation and debate course outlined here makes maximal use
of available resources outside the classroom—political and community ac-
tivity, special library collections, subject matter experts, extracurricular
programs, and audio visual equipment. The course is structured to coin-
citle with the needs and interests of students enrolled in it and would
encourage independent study and re.search in students' major areas. If an
extracurricular debate program exists, the argumentation and debate
course can be compatible with that program, drawing resources from it
while contributing to its advancement.
An activity based course would not neglect argumentation theory. Such
a course is ba.sed on the premise that students understand and apply ar
gument forms and structures most effectively when they use them in per
suasive speaking and various forms ofadvocac)'. If the argumentation and
debate course successfully encourages a broad range of students to un
derstand and use principles of argumentation, then it will continue to
fulfill a vital function in college and university curricula.
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TEACHING PHILOSOPHY AND DEBATE
Henry L. Ruf
"What in the world is a debate program doing in a philosophy depart
ment?" Having been asked this question several dozen times in the past
three years during which I have been traveling the debate circuit, I think
I now am ready to give a defensible answer, especially since I now have
had three years' experience as a philosopher teaching a debate class. For
mal debate is proving to be a very effective educational instrument for
teaching in the normative areas of philosophy—logic, ethics, and theory
of knowledge.
I realize that this special issue of Speaker and Gavel is primarily con
cerned with examining various possible ways of teaching debate and ar
gumentation and that it is read primarily by those who are looking for good
means to attain their academic end of teaching debate as well as possible.
Let me suggest, however, that seeing how debate can be used in teaching
philosophy can lead to a shift of perspective on debate which can make
anyone's teaching of debate more effective. A greater appreciation of the
broad educational significance of debate can increase teacher motivation
and, therefore, effectiveness, and it can lead teachers to add new dimen
sions of depth to their courses which can only be of benefit to the students
in debate classes. In addition, philosophical reflection upon the logical,
ethical, and epistemological issues raised in a typical debate will enable
debaters to handle with much more sophistication the theoretical issues
which are becoming a larger and larger part of good tournament debating.
I have been using formal debate as a teaching tool in my "Current Moral
Problems" classes for the past ten years. I have done so for three sets of
educational reasons. First of all, ever since my years of college debating
in the fifties at Macalester College, 1 have been convinced that debate
(whether classroom or intercollegiate) supplies more motivation to do re
search and argument refinement and sophistication than any other tool in
the teacher's arsenal. The students' egos get marvelously involved when
they know that tliey must defend tlieir position publicly against attacks
from other highly motivated students.
Secondly, debating a controversial moral and social issue reveals to stu
dents so clearly the complexity of such issues, the manner in which de
scriptions of present and past situations, predictions of consequences of
proposed social changes, and normative prescriptions and evaluations are
intertwined together. In gathering supporting evidence and arguments for
each of these sorts of claims they come to see the different sorts of ratio
nales each requires. In making final policy recommendations they come
to see how difficult it is to find a single scale on which to measure the final
significance of claims about rights, about likely consequences of significant
but not earth shattering hanns, and about probable risks of major disasters.
Thirdly, by having students debate both sides of a controversial moral
issue, they have come to see that sometimes disagreements are only a
matter of personal taste and not of moral principle, that sometimes persons
of equally good moral intentions can read nonnative and value priorities
differently, and thus make conflicting recommendations, and that a plu
ralism of moral beliefs and attitudes need not be incompatible with making
Henry L. Ruf is Chairman of the Department of Philosophy and Director of Fo-
rensics at the University of West Virginia.
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objective appraisals of the correctness of such beliefs. A host of theoretical
issues in moral philosophy has forced its way into the consciousness
of the students who elected to participate in these classroom debates.
Three years ago, when debate was about to be dropped at West Virginia
University, the philosophy department agreed to assume responsibility for
it simply because we were convinced of its general educational value.
Developing research skills, developing skills in argument construction and
evaluation, developing the skills to think quickly on one's feet, gaining
substantive knowledge about a host of vital, controversial social policy
options, aiding young intellectuals to emotional and social maturity
through intense competition with other very bright debaters when deci
sions on wins and losses are made in a very subjective manner by judges
whose abilities range from excellent to mediocre—these, we felt, were
educational activities which were very important to maintain. Now that
I have taught a regular debate class for three years, in addition to prizing
debate for its general educational values, I have developed an appreciation
for the way in which philosophical issues can be raised and investigated
in such a cla.ss. At almost ever>' point in the debate it seems as though
major philosophical issues arise which need to be handled. It is this ap
preciation I want to share with >ou in this paper. Let me give a number
of examples.
Start with the issue of topicality. A host of issues in the field of philos
ophy of language is raised by the way debaters attempt to explicate the
meaning of the resolution. Students need to learn the difference between
reportive and stipulative definitions and the reasons why only reportive
definitions can be true or false. Once this distinction is made, debaters
then can begin to consider how to evaluate the fairness or reasonableness
of various stipulative definitions affirmatives might offer for key tenns in
the resolution. Also, students then can begin to reflect on the manner of
determining the necessary truth conditions for paraphrases of the resolu
tion and for explanations of the perinissable uses of key words and phrases
in the resolution, permissable because of the semantical, syntactical, and
pragmatic rules operationally in place in today's English language corn-
inunit>'.
Two examples, I think, will reveal the importance of such philosophical
reflections. First of all, negatives often accuse affirmatives of being non-
topical and of offering unreasonable definitions of the resolution. Often
there is no clash on this issue because it never becomes clear whether the
negative is charging tliat the affinnative is unreasonably stipulating a def
inition or is presenting paraphrases and reportive definitions which can
not be supported with epistemologically justified reasons, i.e., relevant
linguistic practices. In addition, aifinnatives often confuse the issue of the
reasonableness of definitions offered and the reasonableness of the reso
lution. At the 1979 NDT Tournament, I heard an affirmative argue that it
was unreasonable for a negative to ask them to guarantee employment
opportunities to all U.S. citizen.s who wanted jobs; no plan could ever do
that. Of course, that is what the resolution did propose. The affinnative
was either giving a negative solvency argument or was presenting a rea
sonable complaint against the framers of the resolution for placing an un
reasonable burden on the affirmative. The affinnative has a right, of course,
to choose between alternative paraphrases and reportive definitions when
ambiguities exist in common linguistic usage, but the negative surely has
no obligation to restrict its interpretation of the resolution to plans which
the affirmative believes are defensible.
Secondly, affirmatives habitually say that with their plan they opera-
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tionally define the meaning of the resolution or that they are providing
one example or interpretation of the meaning of the resolution. Debate
students need, therefore, to reflect on the nature and appropriateness of
operational definitions. Usually, such definitions are used to select out one
paraphrase which the vagueness or ambiguity of the resolution makes pos
sible. Negatives, of course, can countercharge that the linguistic evidence
does not leave room for such a possibility.
The key additional standard issue which is raised by this affinnative
maneuver is that of detennining what value a national debate resolution
has at all. Should the affinnative be required to defend the resolution with
all of its vagueness and ambiguity, or is it enough to defend one specifi
cation or interpretation of its meaning? If each affinnative is allowed to
rewrite the resolution with new specificity', then is the negative pennitted
to accept this new resolution and run as nontopical counteiplans anything
not identical to the affinnative's plan? Is the negative free to choose to
debate the original resolution and run disadvantages against other lingu
istically pennitted interpretations of tlie resolution?
What function does the debate community want national resolutions to
perform? If it wants to grant idfirmatives the freedom to choose specificity
while requiring the negative to run disadvantages only against the affinn
ative's chosen plan, and permitting the negative to count as nontopical
only those counterplans which lie outside the realm of all linguistically
pennitted interpretations of the resolution, then it probably should say so
explicitly. That certainly places a heavy burden on the negative. If the
debate community wants to encourage meta-level debating about the rules
of debating, then it probably should say so. If it wants to leave things as
they are, then it probabh should say this. Then debaters would know that
they will have to argue for the merits of letting negatives nm counterwar-
rants or counterplans topical under some interpretations of the resolution
not included in the cxffirmatives' interpretation. Anyway, as of now, debaters
need to see the linguistic and value issues involved here and should be
ready to do metadebating about the values and disvalues of various ways
of treating debate resolutions.
Reflecting on the question of topicidity, therefore, provided numerous
opportunities for reflecting on issues in philosophy of language, and such
reflection can contribute greatly to the debater's level of argumentation in
this area. A similar relation exists between the question of negative pre
sumption and philosophical issues in epistemology and ethics-social phi
losophy. Determining ivho has the burden to prove what is as important
an issue in these two fields of philosophy as it is in debate.
A variety of reasons have been offered in the literature on debate in
support of the traditional belief that the affinnative has the responsibility
to provide good and sufficient reasons for adopting the resolution. Some
have supported this belief with value arguments resting on the premise
that existing institutions and practices should be favored over proposed
changes because stability and continuity, in and by themselves, are of such
positive worth that changes should be made only when required in order
to avoid very probable and very significant harms. Others have attempted
to support the traditional belief with the claim that, "We know the effects
of existing institutions and practices but we can only guess at the conse
quences of the proposed changes."
These two supporting reasons, however, are open to serious ethical and
epistemological challenges. Dictatorial stability and the continuation of
injustice and exploitation certainly are of no value in and of themselves.
Additionally, acquiescence by the masses does not prove there is no need
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to change the status (luo. We should have learned from Hegel, Marx, and
the existentialists that exploitive power elites can gain control over a culture
and its institutions of law, religion, education, and recreation, and that they
can pn)duce masses of people who will not demand their moral rights to
personal freedom, autonomy, and social and economic justice. Further
more, those who prize status quo practices over change are working from
the unexamined assumption that it would be a bad idea to let each new gen
eration start from scratch in organizing itself as a community. Good reasons
may exist for our generation to bind a later one, but it is by no means
immediately obvious that one group of people has the right to bind later
generations, that only one set of founding fathers should be free to set up
rules of the game. The epidemic of nationalistic feelings which have cre
ated so many new nation states in the last thirt\- years suggests that many
strong willed people are demanding the right to set up their own rules for
the game of communal living. Reflection in the fields of moral and social
philosophy lend little support to the idea that preserving the status quo is
always, prima facie, to be prized over social change. The advocacy of
keeping things as they are may need as much defense as advocating
change.
In a similar manner, epistemological reflection suggests often that it is
as difficult to predict the consequences of continuing present practices as
it is to predict the effects of making social changes. There are two sets of
reasons for this difficulty, First, it is extremely difficult to know what con
sequences are being produced by a particular institution or practice, even
when it has been observed for some time, because of the way in which
any given social institution, rule, or practice is embedded in a complex
social context which includes other rules, practices, human attitudes,
moods, and beliefs. What are the effects of plea bargaining? One would
know this only b.\' knowing what would happen if that practice were
stopped while ever> thing else remained the same. The latter, of course,
involves predicting the effect of a social change.
The second problem with claiming that knowing the effects of present
practices enjoys epistemological privilege over knowing the effects of
change lies in the fact that such a claim assumes a static world in which
past effects will continue as future effects. This assumption is open to
serious challenge. The physical environment is changing because of pol
lution, oil consumption, atmospheric temperature rise, etc. The social en
vironment certainly is undergoing extremely rapid change. There seems
to be as much reason to suppose that future effects will differ from past
effects as to suppose that they will be the same. Negative presumption
cannot be justifietl this way but thinking about it raises some very impor
tant philosophical issues.
Philosophical considerations in epistemology and ethics eixst which can
be used to defend negative presumption, but they also open up some new
options for affirmatives. One could argue that the affirmative has the bur
den of proofbecau.se it is advocating change and should give justifying
reasons in support of the claim. Since, epistemologically, it is better to be
skeptical about any claim, the burden of proof should rest with the believer
and advocate. Ethically, the burden of proof must lie with one who would
restrict our freedom, with the one who sa\ s we are bound and obligated
to do something because of the presupposition that each person has a
moral right to do whatever one wants to do until someone can give a good
reason for believing there is something wrong with that behavior. The
affinnative says we should do something and, therefore, has the burden
of proof to justify that action.
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The epistemological preference for doubting over believing has a strong
historical pedigree in Western philosophy. Socratic questioning and Carte
sian doubting have kept epistemological concerns at the foundation of
most Western philosophy. Recently, however, this preference has come
under serious challenge. Wittgensteinians have argued that doubting
needs as much justification as believing. Existentialists have claimed a
right to live by leaps of faith when one has no reason to believe one is
choosing the false or impossible. Both have argued that doubting itself
presupposes knowing how to do things with words and concepts and this,
in turn, presupposes extensive knowledge about ourselves and our phys
ical, social, and interpersonal environment, knowledge which creates our
whole form of life and which need not be doubted.
Some of the most interesting issues in epistemology today turn on de
ciding which beliefs are and which are not prima facie acceptable. Re
flecting in a debate class on negative presumption provides a marvelous
opportunity for raising these issues. Luckily for negative debaters, few
philosophers claim that social policy recommendations have presumption
re.sting on their side. Among other reasons, this is because such recom
mendations say we ought to do something and should not be left free in
this area to do as we please. The ethical principle which lies at the base
of democratic liberalism holds that all such restrictions on freedom must
be justified to each of us because sovereignty must rest with the autono
mous individual. The affinnative, therefore, has the burden of proof.
If this is the justification for assigning presumption to the negative, then
it is important to realize tliat an affinnative can use this ethical principle
which ennunciates the priority of freedom by challenging any restriction
existing in the status quo. The affinnative can challenge the negative to
prove that good and sufficient reasons exist for having such a restriction—
a restriction on what high school newspapers can publish, or young adults
can smoke, or dying patients can do to end suffering. Very quickly the
affinnative can shift the burden of proof over onto the negative. The neg
ative must either justify current restrictions or attack the principle which
assigns moral priorit>' to free, sovereign, autonomous, individual persons.
It is also important to note that the priority of freedom principle can be
used to show that all affinnative advantages and negative di.sadvantages
really have to deal with harms to be prevented, and not merely with nice
things to be gained. If restricting freedom is always a prima facie hann,
then restrictions on freedom can be justified only if necessary to prevent
even worse harms. Compulsion may be used only to prevent evils and not
merely to produce benefits. Comparative advantage cases, therefore, are
really comparative disadvantage ca.ses. Finding and defending criteria for
measuring degrees of harm and evil become primary tasks facing any de
bater. This is just another example which shows that a tremendous amount
of education in moral philosophy can occur in a debate class,
There are two otlier issues in debate theory which these philosophical
reflections force us to consider. First of all, has the affirmative met its
burden of proof even if its proves that its plan is sufficient to gain an
advantage which the status quo is inherently prevented from gaining (giv
en that there are no overriding disadvantages)? In other words, a good
reason has been given for adopting the plan. Why, then, must the affirm
ative prove that its plan is either necessary to gain the advantage or is
superior to all other possible plans, as some debate theorists claim? Why
doesn't the affirmative have the epistemological and ethical right to give
its good reason and then wait for negative teams to prove that the reason
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isn't good enough because there are better ways to gain the same result?
Is a good reason a sufficient reason in the absence of a negative counter-
plan? The philosophical considerations I have introduced would seem to
suggest that a plan can be justified without being proven to be the best
among all possible alternatives.
These saine considerations seem also to throw a great deal of light on
the issue of inherency. Something other than a lack of knowledge about
e.xisting hanns must keep the status quo from solving the problem iden
tified by the affirmative. Otherwise, we don't need the affirmative's plan;
we only need the affin^iative to make the need known. Analysis of this
inherency issue provides a marvelous opportunity for considering the na
ture of laws and rules existing in a society', a typical issue in social phi
losophy and in the philosophy of law. Unfortunately, many debaters and
some judges consider as laws or rules only requirements and prohibitions,
mandates to do or not to do something. This overlooks the very important
role which authorizing rules play in a democracy. In the law, as in morality,
sovereignty lies with the individual and priority goes to freedom. Govern
ments need explicit authorization in order to be able to do something. The
absence of such authorization, therefore, constitutes as significant a struc
tural barrier to the status quo being able to solve the problem as does a
legislative or judicial prohibition or an entrenched attitudinal refusal to
take the needed action.
Let me move on to some other debate issues which have important
philosophical implications. Teaching rebuttal techniques provides a mar
velous oppjirtunity for teaching a great deal of logic, deductive and in
ductive. An excellent way to teach students the difference between the
validity and strength of arguments and the truth of premises and conclu
sions is to have the students become aware of the two ways in which a
first negative can refute an affirmative case. Since the affirmative has the
burden of proof, the negative can win simply by pointing out that the
affirmative has not proven its point. This can be done either by showing
that affinnative claims about significance, inherency, and solvency do not
follow from the rationale provided (in other words, the affirmative's line
of reasoning is flawed and its arguments are neither valid deductive ar
guments nor strong inductive arguments) or by showing that the rationale
is based on questionable and undefended premises. Alternatively, the neg
ative can introduce arguments of its own which purport to prove the falsity
of the affirmative's claims.
A tremendous educational advance has been made when any student
sees that proving that someone has not proven a point is very different
fi"om proving the negation of that point. A tremendous advance in under
standing is gained when one comes to see how very difficult it is to prove
anything when it comes to questions of social policy. I think that debaters
who work primarily with conclusionary quotations from so called experts
will not onl> lose to good debaters but they will fiiil to leani, and appre
ciate, how difficult it is to prove what the consequences of a social policy
are or what the net significance of those consequences comes to. Debaters
who recognize this and the reasons for it certainly will learn a great deal
about how to make inductive inferences from statistical premises and how
to proceed in evaluating various sorts of studies. At this point debate train
ing and logic instruction feed upon each other.
Examining affirmative significance and solvency claims and negative
plan attacks also provides opportunities for reflecting philosophically on
the nature of causalit)' and the role of causal claims in inductive arguments
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and scientific theorizing. The need for such reflection becomes painfully
apparent when one listens to debaters talk about what has or has not been
proven to be the cause or effect ol soniethitjg or when one reads judges'
ballots and sees the impossible demands some are making on affirmatives
to prove solvency and on negatives to prove disadvantages. Given that
many current scientific theories do not even talk in terms of causation, and
given that many demonstiably strong inductive arguments to not contain
any causal claims, debaters and coaches need to do a great deal of philo
sophical reflecting on tliis matter.
One marvelous issue to use in getting students to understand the nature
of logical contradictions and how to avoid them is the typical affinnative
claim that first negative inherency or solvency claims contradict second
negative plan attacks or that second negative workability attacks contradict
disadvantage claims. Negatives find themselves in difficulty here only
when they agree with the affinnative that the affirmative plan will produce
a certain kind of result and when the negative wants to claim that this result
causes still further consequences which are disasterous. If the negative
does construct such a disadvantage, then they will contradict themselves
if they also present workability arguments or if they argue under inherency
that the status <juo will and should produce the exact same conse-
(piences as the affinnative. There are numerous ways to avoid contradic
tions here, however. The negative can argue that the disadvantages are
not caused by the consequences which the affinnative claims from its plan
but by the affirmative's way of producing those consequences. In this
latter case, one could still present workability attacks (trying won't produce
advantages, but will produce disadvantages) and in the fonner case inher
ency attacks are still possible (the affinnative way produces disadvantages
whereas the way used b\' the status quo does not).
This same issue also provides an excellent opportunity to reflect on the
nature and significance of" dilemmas. Negatives often try to avoid contra
dicting themselves by arguing hypothetically and forcing the affirmative
into a dilemma. Either the plan won't work or it will cause unjustifiable
disadvantages. This can be a perfectly good argument. There is no need
to prove which half of the dilemma is true. Eitlier is sufficient to warrant
rejecting the affinnative proposal. A very different situation exists, how
ever, when the negative claims that they are arguing hypotheticidly for
both sides of a contrarliction and that they want the judge to decide which
of the two conclusions to believe. Now we have no material dilemma. Now
the negative is introducing arguments without committing themselves
(even in the context of the debate) to any of the arguments' conclusions.
A judge might very well want to conclude in such a situation that the
negative is defending no position (but only introducing positions) and thus
that there is no negative position with which to agree; no choice exists but to
agree with the affirmative. Regardless of a judge's debate philosophy, de
baters and judges need to keep dilemma arguments, categorically defend
ed, separate from arguments introduced hypothetically for judge consid
eration and choice.
There is one final set of debate issues on which I like to concentrate in
my course: that clear reasoning requires the disentangling of arguments
aiul tliat one keep in clear focus the primary thrust of one's overall line of
reasoning. These issues center on the affinnative plan and its traditionally
acknowledged right to fiat this plan into effect and help students under
stand the nature of social policy normative claims and what constitutes
good reasons for justifying them.
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Debate resolutions usually claim that the United States federal govern
ment should adopt a certain social policy, e.g., guarantee job opportunities
to all U.S. citizens or .strengthen the regulation of mass media communi
cation in the United States. As a moral and social philo.sopher I find the.se
wortliy resolutions to debate. It is important lor citizens, congresspersons,
judges, and regulatory bj)ard members and presidents to c onsider the merits
and demerits of such proposals. Before returning to the debate circuit tluee
\ ears ago, I thought it was understood by all in the debate communit>- that
the convention of granting affirmative fiat power was a device used to get
going the thought e.xperiment—the debate about and the consideration of
the merits of the policy. Imagine that this policy were in force, that this
plan were in operation. Would this be a good tiling? What advantageous
consecpiences would result? What disadvantageous effects can be expect
ed? On balance, would it be a good thing to have existing in our social
world? Permitting the affirmative to fiat the plan into existence allowed all
the debaters to locus their attention on the normative nature of tlie reso
lution and to not get sidetracked on irrelevant arguments about whether
the resolution and plan would be adopted, put in place, or kept in place.
One can imagine my surprise, therefore, when 1 found a great portion
of the debate involved with issues which seemed to have nothing to do
with the normative resolution of what the federal government should do.
Affirmatives were including in their plans complex provisions to create
powerful, protected boards with protected funds and enforcement mech
anisms to guarantee that the federal government would not cancel out the
affirmative's policy and plan. Negatives in turn were running disadvan
tages against creating such protected boards, funds, and enforcemetit
mechanisms and against affirmatives having the power to bypass demo
cratic procedures and to fiat pkuis into existence. Negatives were also
numing workabilit>' arguments against unprotectetl boards and funds,
claiming that congress or the president would cut authorization and/or
funding.
It seemed as though a monster hail !)een created which was distracting
debaters' attention away from the original nonnative resolution. It seemed
to me, as an outsider coming in, that a set of practices had developed
which was changing yearly a ver>- important proposed resolution (Resolved
that the federal government should . ..) into a new very insignificant res
olution (Resolved that the affirmative should implement by direct fiat a
plan to . . .). As an educator and as a social philosopher, it seems to me that
a great deal has been lost with the rise of this current tradition. Lines of
reasoning get inuddled. Focus on the intrinsic merits and demerits of social
policy options get fra^nented and, at worst, get abandoned entirely.
That congress, the president, or the courts will or might nullify the
affinnativc plan does not show that they should do so anymore than t!»e
fact tiiat they won't implement the plan shows that it is false to claim that
they should do so. II it is true that the federal government should be doing
sometinng, then it is true that it should put the plan into operation and
keep it in operation. What the govenmient wmuld, will, or might do pro
vides no reason for saying what the government should do.
Given that resolutions usually say nothing about how long the federal
government shoiikl continue doing the action specified or how it should
go about administering the policy when in place, these are specifications
which the affirmative may have to deal with. Workability and disadvantage
arguments against such plan specifications do seem appropriate for they
can reveal demerits of the policy itself and do not turn on the issue of
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whether the federal government would implement or nullify the plan it
self. The issues of authorization and de-authorization of the policy and
plan are the issues which seem to be irrelevant when considering whether
a social policy should be adopted. How things work out when authorized
and operational is always relevant. In an effort to ascertain this, afBrma-
tives are given fiat power so that the thought experiment can be carried
out.
In this paper I have attempted to point out how teaching debate as a
philosophy class can lead to consideration of extremely important issues
in philo.sophy of language, logic, ethics, social philosophy, and philosophy
of law. 1 have also attempted to show how philosophical reflection in each
of these areas can be of great assistance to debaters and coaches. Let me
conclude this paper by pointing out one other way debate can be used as
a general educational tool.
At West Virginia University we offer an interdisciplinary course on the
nature of evidence. This course stresse.s the unity of human knowledge
and examines the manner in which evidence is used to support conclusions
in the physical, biological, and social sciences and in the humanities, es
pecially conclusions about how practical problems are to be solved. Next
year we are going to experiment using typical debate resolutions and ar
guments in teaching this course because we believe that they reveal so
clearly the unity of human knowledge and the way evidence is used in
each area. Arguments about energy systems, weapons systems, pollution,
and health care will introduce students to the natural sciences. Arguments
about unemployment, inflation, and the criminal justice system will do the
same for the social sciences. Free press and privacy arguments will intro
duce students to the nonnative aspect of the humanities. Debate instruc
tors who have researched recent debate resohitions seem ideally suited to
teach such a multidisciplinary course. Putting on debates in such a course
should serve as an excellent pedagogical device for learning in such a
course.
At West Virginia University we believe that debate belongs in a multi-
disciplinary context, and we are happy to have it in our philosophy de
partment, contributing significantly to our instruction in logic, epistemol-
ogy, and moral and social philosophy, even as we try to supply some
understanding of the philosophical issues which contemporary debate rais
es. We urge all debate programs to move out from any narrow confines in
which they may find themsleves and become an integral part of the entire
educational community. I do believe that you will have a better program.
It might even by one which deans will feel better about supporting finan
cially.
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